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				the US economy will impact on our industry
			 
			 
			
		
		
		
		The Daily Reckoning PRESENTS: The strong, compelling  
evidence of an economy that is as far away from a recovery  
as its disastrous job numbers.  
 
 
EMPLOYMENT DISASTER 
By Kurt Richebächer 
 
There has been much talk to the effect that America has  
just had its slightest recession in the whole postwar  
period. That is measured in real GDP growth, being  
bolstered by many statistical tricks. Measured, however,  
by job losses, which certainly are the far more important  
gauge, it is already America's worst recession by far. 
 
In June it was declared that the recession had ended in  
November 2001. Yet in the 20 months since, payroll  
employment has declined by a total of about 1 million  
jobs, or about 8%. In not one of the seven or eight  
postwar recoveries has there been any employment decline.  
Immediate strong job growth has been the regular  
characteristic of all business cycle recoveries. On  
average, payroll jobs increased 3.8% in the 20 months  
following the end of recession. 
 
What's more, no letup in job losses is in sight. During  
the second quarter, widely hailed for its better-than- 
expected GDP growth, the household measure of employment  
slumped by 260,000. However, this figure concealed an even  
greater number of workers - 556,000 - who statistically  
quit the workforce because they have given up looking for  
nonexisting jobs. 
 
This rapidly growing group of people no longer count as  
unemployed. What American job statistics really measure  
are not changes in unemployment, but changes in job  
seekers. Including the frustrated job seekers, the U.S.  
unemployment rate is hardly lower than in Europe.  
Certainly, it is rising much faster. 
 
 
[Feynman's comment: these people will be looking for new ways to make money...]     
 
In addition, the Labor Department is employing month for  
month the same two practices that camouflage the horrible  
reality. In July, for example, it reported a decline in  
payrolls by 44,000, while job losses for June were revised  
upward from 30,000 to 72,000. For May, the retrospective  
upward revision was even from 17,000 to 70,000. As such  
upward revisions of job losses in the prior month have  
become a regular feature, this practice has the convenient  
effect of producing correspondingly lower new numbers  
every month. The same happens, at more moderate scale,  
with weekly reported claims. 
 
There is still more spinning involved. The government adds  
every month some 30,000-50,000 imaginary workers to the  
job total. It is based on the assumption that in an  
economic recovery a lot of people start their own  
business. In normal recoveries, they have done so, indeed. 
 
All it needs to activate this statistical job creation is  
a unilateral decision by the government that the economy  
is in recovery. Once a year, the statisticians reconcile  
their assumption with reality by a revision. When they did  
this in May of this year, 400,000 new jobs that had been  
reported earlier simply vanished. Such revisions, of  
course, take place outside the monthly reported job  
losses. Together, we presume, these statistical  
casuistries have reduced the reported job losses in the  
past two years by well over 100,000 per month.  
 
It rather abruptly became the consensus view that in  
America the great recovery from protracted, sluggish  
growth is finally on its way. Record-low interest rates,  
runaway money and credit growth, new big tax cuts, record- 
high cash-outs by consumers through mortgage refinancing,  
increasing house and stock prices, and rising profits are  
cited as the compelling reasons for this optimism. 
 
We are more than skeptical about the true impact of all  
these influences on the economy primarily for one reason:  
Most of them, if not all of them, have been at work for  
some time already, but with grossly disappointing overall  
effects on the whole economy, and now some of these  
influences are weakening or even reversing.  
 
Think of the sharp rise in long-term interest rates that  
is most assuredly stopping the mortgage-refinancing bubble  
dead in its tracks. That, in our view, will not only abort  
any recovery but will also mean the economy's relapse into  
new recession. 
 
As for fiscal policy, it clearly gave its biggest boost to  
the economy between the fourth quarter of 2000 and the  
second quarter of 2002. That is a period of six quarters  
during which the federal budget gyrated from a quarterly  
surplus of $306.1 billion to a deficit of $526 billion,  
both at annual rate. This year, the deficit is supposed to  
hit $455 billion. Most probably, it will come out much  
higher. But this follows a deficit in the last year of  
$257.5 billion. The fiscal stimulus is waning, not  
increasing. 
 
In any case, actual, historical experience in the 1970-80s  
with large-scale government deficit spending has been  
anything but encouraging. It created more inflation than  
economic growth. Over time, rising deficits were rather  
recognized as impediments to economic growth. Japan's  
recent experience makes frightening reading. Since 1997,  
government debt has skyrocketed from 92% to 150% of GDP,  
rising every year by more than 10% of GDP. Yet nominal GDP  
keeps shrinking. 
 
As to monetary policy, we have very much the same doubts  
about its efficacy in generating economic growth under  
current economic and financial conditions. It is the  
traditional American consensus view that monetary policy  
is omnipotent if properly handled. In this view, any  
recession, or worse, always has its decisive cause in the  
failure of the central bank to ease its reins fast enough.  
In this view whatever happened in the economy during the  
prior boom is irrelevant. 
 
This time, both monetary and fiscal policies in America  
have acted with unprecedented speed and vigor. To people's  
general surprise, the economy's rate of growth abruptly  
slumped during 2000 from 3.7% in the first half to 0.8% in  
the second.  
 
Starting on Jan. 3, 2001, the Fed slashed its short-term  
rate in unusually quick succession. Within just 12 months,  
its federal funds rate was down from 5.98 to 1.82. 
 
Assessing the development, the first thing that struck us  
as most unusual was that this sudden, sharp economic  
downturn occurred against the backdrop of most rampant  
money and credit growth. Total nonfederal, nonfinancial  
credit grew by $1,144.3 billion in 2000, after $1,102.6  
billion in the year before. This compared with nominal GDP  
growth during the year by $437.2 billion. The first  
important conclusion to draw therefore was that this  
sudden economic downturn had obviously nothing to do with  
money or credit tightness. 
 
Ever since, nonfinancial credit growth has sharply  
accelerated. In the fourth quarter of 2002, it hit a  
record of $1,612.8 billion, at annual rate, followed in  
the first quarter of 2003 by $1,338.3 billion. This  
coincided with simultaneous nominal growth of $388.4  
billion and real GDP growth of $224.4 billion, both also  
at annual rate. For each dollar added to real GDP, there  
were thus six dollars added to the indebtedness of the  
nonfinancial sector.  
 
 
Regards, 
 
Kurt Richebächer, 
for The Daily Reckoning 
 
P.S. During the 1960-70s, by the way, there was on average  
about 1.5 dollars of debt added for each dollar of  
additional GDP. Just extrapolate this escalating  
relationship between the use of debt and economic  
activity. And think of it: the GDP growth of today is  
tomorrow a thing of the past, while the debts incurred  
remain. Plainly, Greenspan's policy has collapsed into  
uncontrolled money and debt creation that has rapidly  
diminishing returns on economic activity. 
 
As we noted in these pages last week, the late economist  
Hyman P. Mynsky would call this a Ponzi economy where debt  
payments on outstanding and soaring indebtedness are no  
longer met out of current income but through new  
borrowing. Soaring unpaid interests become capitalized.  
 
 
Editor's note: Former Fed Chairman Paul Volcker once said:  
"Sometimes I think that the job of central bankers is to  
prove Kurt Richebächer wrong." A regular contributor to  
The Wall Street Journal, Strategic Investment and several  
other respected financial publications, Dr. Richebächer's  
insightful analysis stems from the Austrian School of  
economics. France's Le Figaro magazine has done a feature  
story on him as "the man who predicted the Asian crisis."  
  
In the September issue of his newsletter, Dr. Richebächer  
aggressively dissected the data economists are  
interpreting as a miracle 'recovery' - including a  
critical look at defense spending and its aggregate effect  
on the revised GDP numbers for Q2. His conclusion: the  
recovery is hokum. 
		
	
		
		
		
		
		
	
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